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CASE NOTES

Justice Frankfurter had dissented in Lincoln Mills, expressing a fear of
14
the legislative power exercised by virtue of "judicial inventiveness"
creating a body of law peculiar to collective-bargaining agreements. Justice Frankfurter dissented again in Benedict, stating that Section 301 (b) of
the Taft-Hartley Act specifically protects individual members from money
judgments rendered against them solely by "virtue of their union membership,"' 5 while Section 302(c) (5) of the same Act was passed to insure
that welfare agreements be couched in specific terms assuring receipt of
the benefits by union members.' 6
In conclusion, Justice Frankfurter fails to find any justification, either in
the nature of the agreement or in legislative policy expressed in the TaftHartley Act for "jettisoning principles of fairness and justice"' 7 applicable
to all contracts. In his view a "new law of collective bargaining agreements"' 8 has been created.
14 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 465 (1957). Justice Frankfurter's opinion that S 301 is a strictly procedural provision is set out in great detail in
Employees v. Westinghouse Corporation, 348 U.S. 437, 441 to 449, 452 to 459 (1955).
15Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corporation, 80 S.Ct. 489, 497 (1960).
iSJustice Frankfurter quotes at 498 from Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419
(1959).
17 Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corporation, 80 S.Ct. 489, 498 (1960).
18 As was prophesized in Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, in Collective Bargaining and the Law (Univ. of Mich. Law School), pp. 121122, and quoted by Justice Frankfurter in Benedict at 498, 499.

CONTRACTS-UNIQUE TRI-PARTY PROMISE: "I PROMISE
THAT X WILL DRAIN THE MARSH"
HELD BINDING
Plaintiff was in the market for a new home. A real estate salesman directed him to a lot fronting on a marsh. The salesman assured plaintiff
that the original developer of that area intended to convert the marsh
into a lake and that the realty company was "going to see it was done"
because the company owned other lots in the vicinity. Similar assurances
came from Barcroft Woods, Inc., owner of the lots in question, and defendant in the ensuing litigation. Plaintiff and the real estate dealer both
testified that the original developer of the subdivision orally indicated his
firm intention that he would lower the marsh water. The developer denies
this.
All references to the anticipated lake culminated in provision for it in a
contract between defendant Barcroft Woods, Inc., and plaintiff purchaser,
for the sale of a lot improved by a newly constructed house and a fortyfoot beach. The contract provided: "It is further understood that the lake
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is to be 'cleaned out' up to lot 685 by [the original developer]. Beach is to
be forty feet wide and not to be installed until lake is lowered by [original developer]. "Plaintiff paid a greater price for his lot than other lots in
the subdivision would cost, due to its location near the lake. However, the
original developer refused to convert the marsh into a lake. The Virginia
Supreme Court held that the inability to control developer's actions did
not release promisor from its obligation. Barcroft Woods, Inc. v. Francis,
111 S.E.2d 512 (Va., 1959).
"A promise is an undertaking ...

that something shall happen or that

something shall not happen in the future."1 American courts have historically indicated that the "something" shall happen or not happen because
of the action or inaction of the promisor either as a primary actor 2 or as a
surety. 3 Recently, however, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, in
deciding the Barcroft case, announced that: "Contracts frequently carry
provisions whereby the promisor binds himself to procure the performance of an act by a third party,"4 and consequently bestowed the title
"promise" on a most unique grammatical structure.
Thus, the defendant acquired its obligation to have a third party drain
a marsh. A casual observer might conclude, due to the fact that the "understanding" in regard to marsh drainage was signed by both parties, that
plaintiff was to arrange for this necessary improvement in order that defendant might install a beach in accordance with the contract. The court,
however, relying heavily upon parol evidence, concluded that the assurances made by the sales agent prior to the written agreement, which
prompted plaintiff to pay a premium price for the lot purchased, clearly
show that the purpose of the "understanding" inserted in the contract was
to bind defendant for construction of the lake by the developers.
Further, once it was determined that promisor has this duty, the refusal
or failure of a third person to take action essential to the performance did
not, according to the Virginia court, excuse the promisor.5 The court fails
to point out that the failure by the third person in cases relied upon, has
1 Restatement of Contracts, S 2.

E.g., "A promise is a declaration by any person of his intention to do or forbear
from anything at the request or for the use of another." Finlay v. Swirsky, 103 Conn.
624, 632, 131 Atl. 420, 423 (1925).
3 "Suretyship isthe relation which exists where one person has undertaken an obligation and another person is also under an obligation or other duty to the obligee, who
is entitled to but one performance, and as between the two who are bound, one rather
than the other should perform." Restatement of Security, § 82.
4
Barcroft Woods, Inc. v. Francis, 111 S.E.2d 512, 516 (Va., 1959) (emphasis supplied).
5 For this principle the court relied on 12 Am.Jur.,Contracts, § 370, pp. 941, 942, and
Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed., Vol. 6, § 1932, pp. 5413, 5414.
2
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invariably been to perform some preceding act, which failure rendered
action by the promisor impossible. In the instant case, through inaction,
the third person has rendered "impossible" its own action which it was
not bound to perform, but which defendant had bound itself to procure.
Some twelve years prior to the instant case, a Massachusetts court had
occasion to pass upon an equally ambiguous sentence, terming such sentence a mere "prophecy." Sears Boston Employees Federal Credit Union
v. Cummings8 involved a letter written by an attorney to his client's
creditor. The letter requested the creditor to forebear demanding payments pending the outcome of an injury claim which debtor was prosecuting. The letter continued: "If I am successful in settling this matter,
the balance due on this note will be paid at that time."7 Debtor recovered
but creditor did not.
The Massachusetts court noted that the letter did not state by whom
the balance was to paid. Indeed, it could have been by the client, who
owed the debt. In any event, no promise was made by the attorney personally to pay the debt and the Massachusetts court made no attempt to
glean an obligation from parol evidence. It is interesting to consider
whether the Virginia court would find less of a promise in the phrase
"the debt will be paid," than in "the lake will be cleaned out."
Accuracy dictates that it be noted that the statement of the defendant
lawyer in the Sears Boston case, even if it were found to technically constitute a promise, would be unenforceable as unsupported by consideration. Perhaps the element of a premium price paid by plaintiff, partly in
reliance upon a statement-as opposed to a gratuitously made statementwould logically influence the court in characterizing the former as a formal undertaking.
There is only one prior case holding a promisor liable for the actions
of third persons, which promisor had promised would not occur. Tode v.
Gross8 is possibly the negative version of the instant Virginia case. However, the facts reveal an agency relationship between "actors" and promisors which tends to rob the promise of its triparty nature.
Defendant was engaged in the business of manufacturing cheese by secret process. She sold the business and process to plaintiff, covenanting
that she and her agents-her husband, brother-in-law and father-would
not communicate the secret process to parties other than plaintiff vendee
or sell cheese to such other parties. It was discovered that the husband
sold similar cheese and the brother-in-law kept such cheese for sale at his
place of business.
6 322 Mass. 81, 76 N.E.2d 150 (1947).
7 Ibid., 82, 150.
8 127 N.Y. 480, 28 N.E. 469 (1891).
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The element of premium price paid entered the picture when the court
said:
But could she covenant against the acts of those over whom she had no control?
She had the right to so covenant by assuming the risk of their actions, and unless
she had done so, presumptively, she could not have sold her factory for so
large a sum.9
Plaintiff's breach was determined to lie in failing to prevent the actions
of her former agents. "While it is her exclusive covenant, it relates to the
action of others, and if they do what she agreed that they would not do,
it is a breach by her, although not her own act." 10 However, in the very
next sentence, the court in defining defendant's breach, at least implies
that her relationship with her former agents was one making control of
their actions plausible, if not possible. "She violated her agreement, not
by selling herself, but by not preventing others from selling.""u
The Tode case, due to its clear definite language, has since its decision
become a repeatedly cited authority on the validity of covenants protecting secret processes. Most significantly, however, it has always been cited
as determining the rights of exclusive use and sale acquired in an assignment of a trade secret, and that such assignment is not in restraint of
trade. 12 Contractual considerations per se are never discussed. Thus, neither exact factual similarity nor judicial acknowledgment will characterize the Tode case as a twin to the recent Virginia decision.
Another tri-party promise was given consideration in Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co.,1 3 a case involving a contract which
provided that improvements developed by defendant's engineers in familiarizing themselves with apparatus loaned by plaintiff for experimental
purposes should accrue to plaintiff and that defendant should cause its
employees to execute applications for patents and assign them, with improvements, to plaintiff. The United States District Court for the District of Maine held that the allegation that defendant failed to cause its
agent to assign patent application stated a good cause of action. 14 The
court stated, more by way of conclusion than explanation, that plaintiff
was entitled to recover the full money equivalent of the property of
which it had been deprived.
The circuit court did not review the question of whether a cause of
action existed, but ruled for defendant because the record was bare of any
substantial evidence of new information received by defendants, agents or
9 Ibid., at 486, 470.
10 Ibid., at 486, 470.
11 Ibid., at 486, 470.
12 E.g., "[A] trade secret protects its owners only against those who have learned the

secret under a contractual or confidential obligation to preserve the secrecy." Vulcan
Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 67 N.J.E. 243, 247, 58 Ad. 290, 291 (1904).
13 99 F.2d 9 (C.C.A. 1st, 1938).
1456 F.2d 272 (D.C.Me., 1932).
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employees under the contract. Terseness on the part of district court and.
absolute silence of the circuit court prohibit analysis of the nature of
the peculiar promise involved in the Jenkins case.
It is readily seen that the Virginia court has worked an implied enlargement in the scope of the term "promise." The court did so apparently
without notice of the fact or in the belief that a variation in form of a
statement of obligation is secondary in importance to its nature as a recital of liability assumed. For this reason, the decision will probably have
little weight in a jurisdiction choosing to be more analytical when called
upon to ascribe liability predicated upon a similarly constructed "understanding." Until such future judicial examination, it remains an abnormal
specie of one of the basic legal concepts, with little reason behind its
creation-a mutation in the law of contracts.
CRIMINAL LAW-MANSLAUGHTER CONVICTION FOR
FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEDICAL AID TO CHILD
BECAUSE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF REVERSED
The defendants, husband and wife, were convicted of the crime of
involuntary manslaughter under a Maryland statute which provides that
the father and mother are jointly and severally charged with the "support, care, nurture, welfare and education of their minor children."' The
state charged that the defendants were guilty of gross negligence in not
having furnished medical attention to their deceased minor child. The
defense contended that they were conscientious believers in the Church
of God and based their belief in divine healing, and when their child
became sick they cared for it in accordance with the teachings of the
Bible, 2 and that therefore, they were not guilty of any neglect of duty
owing to their child. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the
cases for a new trial, holding that the state's evidence was not sufficient
to show that the gross negligence of the parents was the proximate cause
of the child's death. Craigv. Maryland, 155 A.2d 648 (Md., 1959).
At common law, a parent, or anyone standing in such a relationship
had the duty of furnishing necessaries to his minor unemancipated
child.3 Medical attention, when needed to preserve life or health, is
1 Md. Code (1957) Art. 72A, S 1.
2 "James says, if anyone is sick let him call for the elders of the church, and let them,
pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord, and the prayer of the
faith shall save him." Epistle of St. James, 5:14, 15 (King James version).
3 Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex., 1947); State v. Barnes, 141 Tenn. 469, 212
S.W. 100 (1919); Wallace v. Cox, 136 Tenn. 69, 188 S.W. 611 (1916); Owens v. State,
6 Okla. Crim. 110, 116 Pac. 345 (1911); State v. Chenoweth, 163 Ind. 94, 71 N.E. 197
(1904); Regina v. Anstan, [1893) 17 Cox. C. C. 602.

